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 1 Introduction
One of the major approaches to reducing the world’s poverty is to promote the adoption and
diﬀusion of new technologies in less developed regions. Green Revolution, by introducing
new seeds and intensive agriculture, helped millions of people out of poverty. Eﬃcient
irrigation systems such as sprinkler and drip irrigation not only improve productivity but
also help preserve scarce water resource. Biotechnologies and genetically modiﬁed foods could
potentially signiﬁcantly increase food production in developing countries. Globalization has
the potential of making new technologies available to developing countries. However, it is
the adoption and diﬀusion that eventually determine whether developing countries can truly
beneﬁt from the new technologies brought to them through the globalization process.
Technology adoption and diﬀusion face two main obstacles in developing regions: the
lack of capital, credit and risk-sharing, and the lack of information. A new technology
may require sizable sunk investment, and adopting it could be a risky business. Facing
limited ﬁnancial resource and risk sharing, agents would be reluctant to adopt ”proﬁtable”
technologies if there is a chance that the technologies fail since the sunk adoption costs
cannot be recouped. Compounding the problem is the limited access to information about
new technologies: regions under poverty often do not have well-functioning extension services
by universities or the government. As a result, farmers may at ﬁrst be extremely uncertain
about the proﬁtability of the new technologies.
Without rich external information sources, farmers in developing countries rely heavily
on their neighbors who have already adopted the technologies to obtain such information.
The diﬀusion of new technologies in this case is rather typical: one or few of “leaders” adopt
1a new technology. As the advantage of the new technology is demonstrated by the success
of the early adopters, other local villagers start to follow the suit. The resulting diﬀusion
path is typically logistic, and full adoption occurs gradually.
In a sense, early adopters provide an information service, a positive externality, to their
neighbors. They are the ones who face the initial adoption risk when information is extremely
limited. If they fail, they will bear the sunk cost. If they succeed, others will beneﬁt. In
many cases, a new technology does not get adopted or diﬀused either because there are no
or too few such early adopters, or because these adopters hit a string of bad luck and fail to
demonstrate the advantage of the new technology.
In this paper, we study the role of information and communication in the adoption and
diﬀusion of a new technology in a community of farmers under poverty. The community has
a ﬁxed number of farmers, currently all using a traditional technology. A new technology is
introduced, the proﬁtability of which is uncertain. Farmers have diﬀerent adoption costs due
possibly to their diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion, and a farmer’s adoption cost is his private
information. All farmers in the village share the same initial beliefs about the proﬁtability
of the new technology. When a farmer adopts the technology, others imperfectly observe
the performance of the new technology, and thus obtain more (but possibly imperfect) in-
formation about the proﬁtability. Depending on how closely farmers communicate and the
nature of the new technology, adopters may release diﬀerent degrees of information about
the performance of the new technology.
We study the adoption game in the village where each farmer decides when to adopt
the new technology. Since farmers can learn about the new technology from early adopters,
2each farmer has incentive to wait for others to adopt ﬁrst. That is, each has the incentive to
strategically delay his adoption. Of course, early adoption has the advantage of reaping the
beneﬁts of a successful new technology at an early time. In the (unique) perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, farmers expect that those with lower adoption costs will adopt ﬁrst. However,
since the adoption costs are private information, the adoption process may temporarily stop
when farmers gradually work up their knowledge about who should be the next to adopt.
We use this model to study three approaches to helping promote the adoption and diﬀu-
sion of new technologies: extension service, communication among villagers, and institutions
that compensate early adopters for their information service. Extension service, by provid-
ing initial information about the new technology, clearly helps promote early adoption and
faster diﬀusion. Further, it also helps reduce the incentives of farmers to strategically delay
their adoption decisions.
In our model, there are two kinds of communication among villagers: communication
about each other’s adoption costs, and communication about the proﬁtability of the new
technology. We show that both types of communications may or may not enhance adoption
and diﬀusion, depending on when they occur. For example, although communication about
technology helps disseminate information about the new technology, it also causes farmers
to delay adoption in anticipation of such information in the future. If few farmers have
adopted, the delay eﬀect dominates and better communication can slow down the adoption.
If, on the other hand, a lot of farmers have already adopted the technology, the eﬀect of
information about the technology dominates, and better communication promotes adoption.
Our paper is related to the literature on the role of information exchange among agents
3in technology adoption and diﬀusion. The empirical literature started with agricultural
technologies (Case (1992), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), and Besley and Case (1993, 1997))
and has expanded to medical drugs (Berndt, Pindyck and Azoulay (1999)) and computers
(Goolsbee and Klenow (1999)). Relying mostly on micro-level data, these studies consistently
ﬁnd signiﬁcant neighbor inﬂuences. That is, rational proﬁt-maximizing agents do respond to
information released by other adopters. Further, using a structural estimation model, Besley
and Case (1997) found that agents also anticipate and actively respond to future information
from other adopters: They tend to strategically delay adoption to wait for other adopters’
information. They found that a model with the forward-looking behavior performs better
than one with the agents passively responding to existing information.
Our paper is also related to the information cascade literature (Banerjee (1992), Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) Choi (1997), Zhang (1997), Caplin and Leahy (1998) and
Chamley and Gale (1994)). However, diﬀerent from that literature, in our model the agent
does not have private signals about the technology. Thus his adoption (or nonadoption)
decision in itself does not reveal any information about the technology.
The paper is organized as follows. Following Zhao (2005), we describe the adoption game
and possible diﬀusion patterns in Section 2. Section 3 shows the approaches that could
promote adoption and diﬀusion of new technologies in developing countries. We discuss the
impacts of new technologies on poverty in Section 4, and conclude the paper in Section 5.
42 The Adoption Model
We sketch the adoption model in this section; the details are in Zhao (2005). Consider a
village of N farmers, which each farmer being a single decision maker. The farmers are
similar in several aspects: they are under poverty with limited access to credit markets, and
they are currently using the same farming technology, termed traditional technology. As
the economy opens up, a new technology is introduced that has the potential of directly
increasing farm income. However, the new technology also introduces uncertainty and the
possibility of a loss. Speciﬁcally, adopting the new technology requires a sunk cost that could
be a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial liability for a farmer under poverty. The proﬁtability of the new
technology is uncertain, with a strictly positive probability that the added income from the
new technology cannot fully compensate the adoption cost.
The sunk adoption cost could be diﬀerent for diﬀerent farmers, depending on their degrees
of risk aversion, ﬁnancial resources, abilities and familiarity with operating new technologies,
and the technology’s ﬁt to their needs. For example, farmers with oﬀ-farm income may
have higher abilities to bear the uncertainty, and those with higher education levels or
more experiences with similar technologies will incur lower adoption costs. We call the
idiosyncratic part of the adoption cost each farmer’s type, which is his private information.
Others only have imperfect information about this type.
Formally, without loss of generality, we normalize the proﬁt of the traditional technology
to zero. Farmers have the same imperfect initial information about the new technology’s
constant per period proﬁt e, knowing that it is distributed non-atomically according to F0(·)
on [el,e h]w i t hel > 0. The sunk adoption cost of farmer n is cn = θnc,w h e r eθn is the
5farmer’s type and c>0. Other farmers in the village do not know θn for sure, knowing only
that it is non-atomatically distributed according to G0(·)o nΘ≡ [θ,1] with θ > 0. Such
beliefs are i.i.d. across the farmers.
Since el > 0 and the adoption cost is sunk, the adoption is irreversible. That is, new
technology users will never abandon it in favor of the traditional technology, even if the new
technology performs less than expected and results in a net adoption loss. The likelihood of
a loss from the new technology clearly depends on a farmer’s type: it is more likely for higher
type/cost farmers. To rule out trivial cases, we assume values of parameters el, eh,a n dθ
such that every farmer type faces strictly positive probabilities of adoption losses as well as
of net gains. In other words, given prior information about e, every farmer could potentially
gain from adopting the new technology, even for those whose types are high (close to 1), and
every farmer could also lose from adoption, even for the low cost types (close to θ).
Since adoption is irreversible and incurs sunk costs, real option theory implies that farm-
ers have incentive to obtain more information before adoption. We assume that the only
information source to supplement the prior information about e is farmers who have already
adopted the new technology. Suppose farmer n adopts in period t. At the end of this pe-
riod, others who have not adopted, called remaining farmers or farmers, will observe the
performance of the new technology, e.g., the crop yield or hte adopter’s realized proﬁt. The
performance depends on both the technology’s eﬃciency e and a range of random factors
such as weather, farmer n’s eﬀort, etc. We let pn denote the signal, which is a function of
e and a random variable εn. Observing pn, the remaining farmers update their belief about
e according to Bayes rule. The updated belief becomes the starting belief about e in period
6t + 1. Clearly, the updated belief about e is more accurate when more farmers adopt and
thus more signals about e are released. Under certain regularity conditions, the Bayes rule
also means that when a higher pn is observed, the remaining farmers believe that e is higher.
For simplicity, we also assume that pn is constant through time, i.e., each adopter releases
information about e only once. Thus, after a farmer adopts, it releases a signal about e and
is out of the adoption game.
The adoption game is then a dynamic Bayesian game, where a history consists of the
adoption decisions of the farmers as well as their realized proﬁt signals, and the players at
each history consist of the remaining farmers at that point. Their actions are simply to adopt
or to wait until future periods, and a farmer’s strategy is a function describing his action as
a function of the history and his type. The (common) starting belief about player types is
given by G0(·), which is subsequently updated after observing the actions of the players.
At each point in time, information about e is described entirely by the prior F0(·)a n d
the collection of signals that have been observed so far. Let It be a realized history in period
t, which includes the collection of the observed signals up to time t.I ff a r m e rn decides to






where r is the discount rate, and the expectation of e is taken conditional on the signals in
It.
If farmer n decides to wait, his expected payoﬀ depends not only on his belief about e
but also on his belief about the number of additional signals he expects to observe in future
7periods. The latter belief in turn depends on his belief about the number of adopters in
future periods, or the types of the remaining farmers. If he believes that the remaining
farmers are of low cost types, he would expect to receive more signals in the future than
if his belief is that the remaining farmers are of high types. Let g−n(t) be the density of
n’s belief about the types of other remaining farmers, and s−n be their strategies in future










That is, if farmer n waits in period t, he will again decide whether or not to adopt in period
t + 1, when his belief about e will be updated based on the new signals released by the new
adopters in periods t, and his belief about the types will be updated based on the actions of
the remaining farmers in period t.
Zhao (2005) shows that this game has a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE). Along an equilibrium path, low cost farmers adopt ﬁrst: if at any time a farmer of
type θ1 adopts, then all farmers of type θ ≤ θ1 either have already adopted or will also adopt
in this period. The intuition is that waiting is beneﬁcial only when new information about
e helps avoid bad investment. Otherwise, if all possible future information suggests that the
new technology should be adopted, the farmer should adopt now due to discounting. Since
higher cost types face higher likelihoods of bad investment, future information is more useful
to them. They are more willing to wait and less willing to adopt now.
The equilibrium strategy at time t is thus represented by a critical type, η∗
t,s ot h a t
8farmer types with θn ≤ η∗
t will adopt and those with θn >η ∗
t will wait. Of course, η∗
t is a
function of history It, which contains information about e. Since all farmers whose types are
below η∗
t have adopted at the end of period t, this equilibrium strategy becomes the starting
belief in the next period: in period t + 1, the remaining farmers all have types distributed
according to G0(·) conditional on θ>η ∗
t. In other words, the belief at t + 1 is represented
by a number, denoted by ˆ ηt+1, which equals the equilibrium strategy in the previous period
η∗
t.
At time t,g i v e nh i s t o r yIt and belief about types of remaining farmers ˆ ηt, the equilibrium
strategy is η∗
t(It, ˆ ηt). Clearly, as the realized proﬁt signals in It increase, η∗
t also rises. When
remaining farmers observe higher proﬁt signals, they are more willing to adopt (or more
types will adopt). Further, when belief ˆ ηt rises, η∗
t also increases. When a remaining farmer
believes that the other remaining farmers are of higher cost types (since ˆ ηt is higher), he
expects that the other farmers will be less likely to adopt in this period. Consequently, fewer
new proﬁt signals about e will be generated by waiting, resulting in lower incentive for this
farmer to wait, or higher incentive for him to adopt now.
The realization of a speciﬁc equilibrium path depends on the realizations of the proﬁt
signals of adopters. The distribution of the possible paths covers a range of diﬀusion patterns
observed in the real world. For example, the adoption process may take some time to start
even after the new technology is made available, and the diﬀusion process may temporarily
stop for several periods before it resumes. The late start and temporary stops usually do
not arise in other game theoretic adoption models, and is a unique feature of our approach.
To see how this can happen, consider the ﬁrst period when the only available information
9about e is F0(·). Given this information, and belief about the farmer types, an equilibrium
strategy η∗
1 exists, implying an agreement and expectation that farmers with types θ ≤ η∗
1
will adopt. However, given the non-atomatic belief F0(·) and ﬁnite number of farmers, there
is a strictly positive probability that all types of the farmers are above η∗
1.I ft h i si si n d e e d
the case, nobody adopts and no new signal is generated about e. Then the period two game
is diﬀerent from the period one game in only one aspect: the belief about the types of the
f a r m e r si su p d a t e dt ob eG0(·) conditional on θ>θ ∗
1.T h a ti s ,ˆ η2 = η∗
1. Since the farmers
are believed to be of higher costs, the incentive to wait decreases or the incentive to adopt
rises. Thus the equilibrium strategy η∗
2 is higher than η∗
1. If still every farmer’s type is above
η∗
2, the game enters period three with the belief that θ>η ∗
2, resulting yet in an even higher
η∗
3. This process continues until low cost farmers start to adopt. By the same argument, the
diﬀusion process may stop temporarily when there is no farmer type below the equilibrium
strategy in a period, until the belief ˆ ηt works itself up so that new adopters materialize.
In our model, the diﬀusion process stops either when all farmers have adopted or when
the last adopters release suﬃciently strong negative proﬁt signals so that in hindsight, they
should not have adopted. Suppose several farmers adopt in period t, and at the end of t,
extremely low proﬁt signals are released by these adopters. In fact, these signals are so low
that, based on the new information about e in It+1, some of these adopters should not have
adopted: η∗
t+1(It+1, ˆ ηt+1) <η ∗
t(It, ˆ ηt). Since η∗ is increasing in proﬁt signals in I and ˆ η,t h i s
inequality is possible when the new proﬁt signals in It+1 are suﬃciently low. Then in period
t + 1, no farmer will adopt since everyone’s type is above ˆ ηt+1 = η∗
t, which is higher than
the equilibrium strategy η∗
t+1. Further, the belief about farmer types will not be updated
10in period t + 2 since it is expected that nobody will adopt in period t + 1. In other words,
the fact that nobody adopted in t+1 does not bring any new information about the farmer
types.
Therefore, there are two possibilities in which zero adoption can occur in a period. The
farmers may have expected some low cost types but it turns out that everyone is of relatively
high costs, or the new adopters hit bad luck and release strongly negative signals. The ﬁrst
scenario only leads to temporary stop of the diﬀusion process as belief about types can work
itself up. The second scenario causes complete stop of the process.
The equilibrium diﬀusion path is also likely to demonstrate a logistic pattern, which
has been documented for a range of technologies. The intuition is quite simple. In early
periods, there are few proﬁt signals due to the small number of adopters. The farmers thus
have strong incentive to wait for more information, resulting in a slow adoption rate. As
more farmers adopt and more signals are observed, the incentive to wait goes down and the
adoption rate goes up. Eventually the adoption rate will fall again because only high cost
farmers are left.
3 Promoting the Diﬀusion of New Technologies
The adoption model provides a useful tool to study informational approaches to promoting
the adoption and diﬀusion of new technologies and to study the eﬀects of globalization and
poverty on the diﬀusion process. We discuss the implications of our model in the following
three aspects.
113.1 Initial Information Provision
The adoption model shows that more starting information about a new technology will
promote its adoption in two ways. First, since farmers under poverty are typically risk averse,
more information reduces the risk premium part of the adoption cost. Second, over and
above the risk premium eﬀect, even when farmers are risk neutral, more starting information
reduces the farmers’ incentive to delay adoption in anticipation of more future information.
That is, it promotes adoption by reducing farmers’ strategic delay incentives.
Initial information about new technologies, especially agricultural technologies, could
come from a range of sources, including extension services of universities and government
agencies, marketing specialists, and private technology consultants (Sunding and Zilberman
(2001)). There is well documented evidence of the importance of extension services in im-
proving agricultural productivity (Rosegrant and Evenson (1992), Jin et al. (forthcoming)).
Some developing countries such as China have widely utilized demonstration projects in
providing information about new technologies.
Globalization plays a vital role in disseminating information about new technologies.
As summarized in Keller (2004), over 90% of the technological explanations for an average
country’s productivity growth is from foreign sources. Through international trade, foreign
direct investment, and interaction among persons with scientiﬁc and technological expertise,
globalization helps bring new technologies from their inventors to eventual users. Our model
indicates that to fully utilize the potential brought about by globalization, developing country
governments should strive to enhance extension services, and establish marketing channels
in order to increase information ﬂow to the rural population.
12Information service is even more important for farmers under poverty, because they are
the ones who are more risk averse and who are more willing to delay adoption for more
information. In other words, information services will be more eﬃcient in promoting adop-
tion when potential adopters have limited ﬁnancial resources. A viable poverty alleviation
tool, therefore, is information provision, in addition to the traditional tools such as income
transfer.
3.2 Communication about New Technology and about Each Other
Since early adopters provide information service to other potential adopters, it has been
argued that increased communication about new technologies helps promote adoption and
diﬀusion. However, our game theoretic model shows that if this kind of communication
becomes more eﬀective, farmers may expect that future signals from early adopters will
carry more information about the new technology. They may have more incentive to delay
adoption and wait for such signals, so that increased communication about technologies
could delay rather than expedite the adoption process.
Thus communication about new technologies leads to two opposing forces in the adop-
tion process. If there are already suﬃciently many adopters, more eﬃcient communication
increases the information content of their signals. Increased information helps remaining
farmers make more informed decisions and will speed up adoption. Otherwise, if there are
no or few adopters, the prospect of more communication will only serve to delay the adoption
process. It is then important to time the communication about technologies to balance the
two factors. For example, a mechanism may be set up in which information exchange about
13the new technology will be conducted only after a suﬃciently high proportion of the farmers
have adopted the technology.
Our model indicates that the adoption process is also aﬀected by imperfect information
about other farmers’ types or their likelihood of adopting the technology. Consequently,
communication about the types will also aﬀect the adoption process. Again, timing of this
kind of communication is important. Consider a technology that is gradually diﬀused. In
early periods, only extremely low cost farmers will adopt without waiting for more proﬁt
signals. To the extent that increased communication reduces the variance of the belief about
types, the probability of expecting truly low types will go down as the variance decreases.
That is, more communication reduces farmers’ expectation of the number of early adopters.
Since waiting leads to fewer expected signals, the incentive to wait goes down and the
adoption speeds up. Thus, exchanging information about each other’s likelihood of adoption
at the beginning of the diﬀusion process will speed up adoption.
However, increased communication about types may slow down adoption in the middle of
the diﬀusion process for gradually diﬀused technologies. Suppose, without loss of generality,
the belief is such that the types are normally distributed. As the communication reduces the
variance of beliefs, the believed probability of farmers in the middle of the distribution goes
up. That is, the expected number of new signals will also go up, increasing the incentive to
wait and reducing the incentive to adopt now.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the two kinds of communication, about
the technology and about each other. They may have opposite impacts on adoption, and
each may have diﬀerent impacts depending on the phase of the diﬀusion process. Simply
14increasing information exchange may not always speed up adoption.
3.3 Subsidizing Early Adopters
Our model shows that early adopters provide a positive information externality to other
potential adopters. Lack of mechanisms for early adopters to internalize the externality
leads to lower than eﬃcient adoption rate. Thus, one approach to speed up adoption is
to compensate early adopters for their information service. The eﬃcient compensation level
equals the expected gain of others from the new proﬁt signals, which includes both the direct
information value and the value from reduced strategic delay due to increased information.
There are several ways in which early adopters can be compensated.
A simple mechanism is for the government to directly subsidize early adopters. For ex-
ample, the government may oﬀer cost sharing, rebates or price discounts for new technologies
that are not widely adopted. The subsidy rate can be gradually reduced as the adoption rate
increases, and eventually phased out. The subsidy enhances incentives of farmers to adopt
now, and the fact that the subsidy rate gradually decreases reduces the incentives to wait.
Such a program essentially maintains eﬃcient information transmission from early adopters
to others while overcoming the strategic delay that would be a result of the anticipation of
the information exchange.
Another mechanism, especially useful for risk averse farmers, is for the government to
oﬀer and/or to subsidize technology insurance for early adopters. That is, if e turns out
to be below expected and the early adopters suﬀer losses, the government will step in and
compensate (partially or completely) for the losses. Depending on the signiﬁcance of the
15information externality, the insurance premium could be subsidized. When there is no pri-
vately provided insurance for new technologies, which is typically the case in areas under
poverty, such a government program is advantageous over a direct subsidy because it of-
fers risk sharing service for the farmers concerned. The insurance should be oﬀered for all
adopters, although the subsidy could be gradually reduced as the rate of adoption rises.
This kind of subsidized insurance could also be oﬀered by a village itself, where farmers
pool resources together to insure early adopters. In this mechanism, potential adopters
“pay” for the information service of early adopters by insuring their adoption. In essence,
a community or village could be organized to pay, one way or another, for “demonstration
projects” oﬀered by early adopters. It is especially useful when governments lack ﬁscal
resources to oﬀer direct subsidies or subsidized insurance.
4 Impacts of Technology Adoption on Poverty
Our model shows the intuitive result that more eﬃcient technologies (those with higher e)
are adopted by more farmers and are diﬀused more quickly. To the extent that the new
technology raises farmers’ income, it also alleviates poverty, particularly in the long run and
on average.
However, new technologies may not alleviate poverty for every adopter. Consider the
intuitive scenario where the signals about the new technology are the realized proﬁts of the
adopters. We showed that unless the technology is adopted by every farmer, the diﬀusion
process stops only when the last adopters regret their adoption decision: their net payoﬀs
from adoption are negative. In other words, unless the technology is for everybody,w h i c h
16is uncommon if there is such a technology at all, some farmers, i.e., the last adopters, will
inevitably be made worse oﬀ by the new technology. If farmers under more severe poverty
are more reluctant to adopt, the order of adoption starts with wealthier farmers, followed by
those with less wealth. Then the last adopters who are made worse oﬀ by the new technology
could well be those who needed help the most! The new technology in fact will aggravate
their poverty problem.
Our model assumes that there is no network eﬀect: if a farmer chooses not to adopt,
his payoﬀ is not directly aﬀected by the fact that other farmers have adopted the new
technology. However, new technologies typically involve network eﬀects, either positive or
negative. For example, if the new technology increases the yield, and suﬃciently large
number of farmers adopt, the price of the agricultural output is likely to be pushed down
as the adopters’ supplies increase, thereby reducing the proﬁt of the non-adopters. Again,
if the latter adopters and non-adopters are those under more severe poverty, this kind of
negative network eﬀect will aggravate the poverty problem. Of course, some technologies
have positive network eﬀects. For example, as the number of adopters increases and the
market share of the new technology rises, the price of the technology may go down. If there
is learning by doing and learning from others, latter adopters may learn from the experiences
of using the new technology by early adopters, increasing the proﬁt of latter adopters. The
positive network eﬀects thus help alleviate poverty for every farmer.
Thus whether a new technology alleviates poverty depends to a large extent on the nature
of the new technology. Technologies that are suitable for even the lowest income farmers help
reduce poverty. Those with positive network eﬀects also alleviate poverty even if they are
17adopted only by relatively wealthier farmers. However, technologies with negative network
eﬀects that are suitable only for wealthy farmers could hurt farmers under poverty.
The above discussion indicates that poverty alleviation requires much more than simply
introducing new technologies. Other poverty alleviation programs are needed to compen-
sate for the possible negative eﬀects of new technologies, and, where new technologies do
help reduce poverty, to help reduce incentives against adoption and diﬀusion (such as to
compensate for the information externalities of early adopters).
5C o n c l u s i o n
An important channel through which globalization aﬀects poverty is the introduction of new
technologies to developing countries. Even if a new technology can improve the income
of rural farmers, it may not be adopted by all and its diﬀusion may be slow due to sunk
adoption costs and uncertainties in net payoﬀs of the technology. This paper studies one
important factor in the adoption process: information exchange between adopters and others.
In particular, early adopters release information about the technology, which other potential
adopters can utilize to make a more informed decision.
We show that the information service by early adopters may either speed up or slow
down the diﬀusion process. When there are no or few early adopters, anticipation of such
information increases farmers’ incentive to delay adoption to wait for more information,
reducing the adoption rate. The information service helps speed up diﬀusion only when a
suﬃciently large number of farmers have already adopted the technology.
Information exchange can also be about each farmer’s likelihood of adoption in the current
18and future periods. We showed that this kind of exchange helps improve adoption in early
phases of the diﬀusion process, but may reduce adoption in the middle part of the diﬀusion
process.
Our model has important implications for ways to help speed up adoption and diﬀusion,
including providing more initial information about new technologies, timing communication
about the technology and about each farmer, and compensating early adopters for their
information services. Our results also indicate that unless a new technology is for everybody,
it will inevitably hurt some farmers, i.e., the last adopters before the diﬀusion stops. Even if a
new technology improves farmers’ income on average, it may aggravate the poverty problem
for a subset of farmers.
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